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GUN CONTROL
All firearms are capable of taking human life. Nevertheless, it is
true that firearms can provide a safe means of recreation as well as serve
a legitimate "protection from danger/self-defense" function. However,
this should not obscure the fact that guns, with their inherent death-
producing potentiality, should be placed under the strictest of con-
trols.15' However, in the United States, where the preservation of hu-
tial And Congressional War-Making Powers, 50 B.U.L. Rxv. 78 (1970) (special issue). The
note explores the traditional principles comprehended by the political question doctrine
in the context of a hypothetical congressional statute condemning the President's actions
and excusing servicemen from orders to Vietnam or Cambodia. The use of the statute
reduces the issue to whether it is within the power of Congress to control the President's
actions by a restrictive statute when, in the opinion of Congress, such actions have exceeded
defensive measures.
151 Firearms unfortunately are not governed by the strictest of controls because of a
general reluctance by legislatures to enact stricter gun control statutes, due in part to
the constitutional problems involved in enforcing such laws. For example, the constitutional
safeguards against self-incrimination have been expanded recently in three landmark
decisions prohibiting self-incrimination by disclosure required by federal registration
requirements. In Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 36 (1968), a conviction against a
professional gambler for willfull failure to register as such and pay the $50 wagering
tax imposed by statute was reversed. The Court held that provisions requiring voluntary
registration and admission of an illegal activity may not be used to impose criminal
liability upon one who defends his failure to comply by utilizing a proper assertion of
the privilege against self-incrimination. In Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), a
conviction for failure to pay the wagering excise tax and gambler's occupational tax
imposed by 26 U.S.C. §§ 4401 and 4411, (1970) and conspiracy to defraud the government
by evading payment of these taxes was reversed. The Court recognized that the wagering
tax provisions were directed almost exclusively against those suspected of criminal activity
and as such were violative of the self-incrimination protections secured within the fifth
amendment.
However, the basis for the most effective fifth amendment challenges to gun controls
is contained in Hays v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), where the Court reversed a
conviction for knowingly possessing an unregistered firearm specifically defined in the
National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5851 (1970). Because the act's requirements are
applicable only to sawed-off rifles and shotguns, automatic weapons and silencers,
petitioner contended that the act was obviously intended to apply to those weapons used
by persons engaged in criminal activity. Petitioner moved to dismiss, asserting that his
privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment was violated by
the Act. The Court agreed, holding that a proper fifth amendment claim will provide a
full defense to prosecutions for failure to register or for possession of an unregistered
firearm. However, it should be noted that the Court in Marchetti, reiterated the recognized
principle that taxes may be imposed upon unlawful activities. In addition, there may
be those who own a federally unregistered firearm who, as a class, may be prohibited from
possessing a firearm under state and/or local laws. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-28,
33 (1971), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 151-9 (1969), N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.05 (McKinney 1971),
and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4628 (1970) where such classes as convicted felons, mental
incompetents and minors are prohibited from owning firearms. However, these people
may successfully argue that the Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1970),
itself provides a defense against state prosecution by invoking fifth amendment protection
based on Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). There petitioners were
convicted of contempt for refusing to answer questions posed by a New York Waterfront
Commission, even though they had been granted immunity from state prosecution. The
Court, per Justice Goldberg, overturned the "established rule" that the constitutional
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man life theoretically occupies the highest of priorities, any attempt
to strengthen existing gun control laws immediately triggers outcries
from both sides of the issue which border on the extreme, add nothing
to the dialogue which must occur before meaningful legislation can be
enacted, and fail to make any headway in dealing with the problem of
firearms' proliferation which is rapidly becoming firearms' pollution.152
This dilemma is only aggravated, it seems, by the widespread feeling
that any increase in the pervasiveness of gun controls is another step in
the process of American emasculation, which can be traced to an intui-
tive belief that every citizen has an undeniable common-law right to
own a deadly weapon, often referred to as one's "right to bear arms."' 5
However, any American right to bear arms included in the Constitu-
tion'54 should be seen as having been written by men well aware of the
privilege against self-incrimination does not protect a witness in one jurisdiction against
being compelled to give testimony which could convict him in another jurisdiction, and
reversed on the grounds that petitioners' answers might have tended to incriminate them
under federal law.
152 But see Violence Symposium, 14 N.Y.L.F. 694 (1968), for the kind of intelligent
dialogue which must occur before meaningful solutions to the firearms proliferation
problem can be found.
153 It appears that belief in such a "right" is quite old and not restricted to the
West. In 124 B.C. the Imperial Chancellor Kung-Sun Hung petitioned the Chinese
Emperor Han to take away the people's arms. In turning down the petition the Emperor
stressed the right of the individual to bear arms for the common protection of society
as well as the individual. See AMRIcAN RIEMAN, Jan. 1959, at 14, cited in Hays, The
Right to Bear Arms: A study in Judicial Misinterpretation, 2 WAx. & MARY L. REv. 381 n.1
(1960) [hereinafter Hays]. In the West, these same concepts arose majestically in the
Magna Carta of 1215 where it was provided that if the King did not follow the pro.
visions of the charter, the barons could then exercise their right to correct the King by
force. Thus the right of lawful revolution is said to have been born into the constitutional
law of England, and this seems to mandate a corresponding right to bear arms to achieve
this end. See Hays supra.
Arguments championing the existence of a right to bear arms draw their strength
from two principal sources. First and fundamentally, they look to a right of personal
and familial preservation and defense. See generally Emery, The Constitutional Right To
Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARv. L. Rav. 473 (1914); McKenna, The Right To Keep and
Bear Arms, 12 MAaq. L. R.v. 138 (1927) [hereinafter McKenna]; Rohner, The Right to
Bear Arms, A Phenomenon of Constitutional History, 16 CATH. U.L. R.v. 53 (1966).
Second, albeit more controversially, arms bearing can be defended on the basis of the
right of "lawful revolution", i.e., one's right to resort to force when law fails through
the establishment of a "well-regulated militia composed of the body of the people"
because this is "the natural and safe defense of a free state." Virginia Bill of Rights of
12 May 1776, cited in Hays' supra, at 391 n.34.
154 The second amendment reads: "A well-regulated militia being necessary to the
security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be in-
fringed." Often cited by laymen as the protector of the citizen's right to own a weapon,
the second amendment was long ago rendered impotent from the viewpoint of affording
constitutional defenses to state and federal gun controls. See United v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1875), where the Court reversed the conviction of Louisiana whites under the
Enforcement Act of 1870 for conspiracy to prevent blacks from bearing arms for lawful
purposes and held that the right of the people to keep and bear arms is not a right
granted by the Constitution.
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necessary limitations on such a right, derived from the police power of
the government and the common-law restrictions on weapons-bearing
in public. 55 It seems logical then, that just as we would agree to the
need for restricting widespread weapons-bearing in public in our ur-
banized society, we should also agree to the need for restricting gun
ownership per se as the logical means for achieving that end. For ex-
ample, no reason exists why a weapon should be available to the general
public that by reasonable standards serves no legitimate sporting or
security purpose. No responsible citizen presumably would question
the need for some sort of gun ownership restriction, at least as applied
to weapons of clearly ludicrous relationship to any sporting or security
function. 50 It is within this context that the Second Circuit clearly
Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.
The second amendment declares that it should not be infringed; but this . . .
means no more than it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the
amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national
government....
Id. at 553. Cruikshank was adhered to in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1885),
where the Court went on to hold that "a conclusive answer to the contention that this
amendment prohibits the legislation in question lies in the fact that the amendment
is a limitation only upon the power of congress and the National Government, and not
upon that of states." But see Hays, supra note 153, at 405, where a most persuasive
argument is advanced that these opinions are more the children of the Civil War and
"Black Republican Reconstructionism" than jurisprudential essays in constitutional in-
terpretation denying the existence of a fundamental right to bear arms.
In those instances where the American courts have dismissed the matter of the exis-
tence of a right to bear arms, they have said merely that the constitutions do not create
the right, but only protect it. See McKenna, supra note 153, at 149. However, it appears
that if and when this issue is finally raised for Supreme Court adjudication, it will be
denied and any such right to own a weapon couched in one's right to bear arms will be
defined as vesting within the power of society to create one along with those limitations
it deems necessary. In fact, the death knell may have already sounded in 1924 in
People v. Camperlingo, 69 Cal. App. 466, 473 231 P. 601, 604 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1924),
when the court said
It is clear that, in the exercise of the police power of the state, that is, for the
public safety or the public welfare generally, such right (to bear arms) may be
either regulated or in proper cases, entirely destroyed.
However, the court seems to recognize that the right to bear arms nevertheless predates
society's creation of the state and its police power.
155 To the extent that one searches the English experience for the source of a right
to bear arms as an inviolate constitutional principle, one must realize that there never-
theless is a long established history of restrictions upon weapons bearing. For example,
in 1328, during the reign of Edward III, the enactment by Parliament of the Statute of
Northampton, I. STATUTES OF THE REALM 258 (1963), provided that none "except the
King's servants" should "go nor ride armed by night nor by day . . . upon pain to for-
feit their armour to the King, and their bodies to prison at the King's pleasure." Thus
was established the statutory misdemeanor of going about armed, which along with the
Common Law on England was adopted by the colonies. See R. PEaINS, CtiJMINAL LAW
365 (1953).
156 See, e.g., the National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. § 5801 et seq. (1970) which
sought to control by prohibitive taxes the sale, importation and transfer of criminal-type
weapons (machine guns etc.) used by the underworld during Prohibition. However, it has
little contemporary significance in curtailing weapons proliferation. The Federal Firearms
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established its intention to keep such ludicrous firearms out of circula-
tion in its decision in United States v. 16, 179 Molso Italian .22 Caliber
Winlee Derringer Convertible Starter Guns.15
In August 1969, an agent of the Alcohol Tax and Firearms division
(ATF) of the Internal Revenue Service purchased a derringer-type .22
caliber starter gun from a third party who had purchased it from the
appellant, Lee. The agent was able to convert the gun to fire live am-
munition with the aid of an electric drill in less than ten minutes. An-
other ATF agent was able to convert an identical gun purchased from
the same source to fire live ammunition in the same way in five or six
minutes. As a result of these two purchases, officers of ATF seized a
total of 16,179 Molso starter guns at Lee's place of business. Lee was not
a licensed dealer in firearms under the federal act' 58 which provides that
firearms imported contrary to the statute, i.e., by an unlicensed dealer,
are subject to confiscation. 59 Thereafter, Lee commenced an action to
enjoin such confiscation, and the government brought an action to
enforce the order. Upon stipulation of the parties, the cases were con-
solidated. The issue thus joined was whether the starter guns confiscated
by the government were firearms within the meaning of the statute.
During the trial, the government demonstrated with the help of
Act of 1938, ch. 850, § 9, 52 Stat. 1252, on the other hand, specifically prohibited licensed
dealers from knowingly selling weapons to felons or those indicted for a felony and from
knowingly dealing in stolen weapons. However, while the act appeared to be readily
applicable to current problems, it proved to be completely ineffective because scienter,
or reasonable cause to believe that the purchaser was a member of the prohibited group,
had to be proven. Yet, while such laws have made the practice of carrying a violin-cased
"Thompson," now only a late movie clich6, they clearly have not attacked the dual
source of modern weapons pollution, i.e., the widespread availability in many states of
cheap mail-order war surplus weapons and cheap small caliber handguns, and the
impotence of federal law to curb their continued manufacture and sale. For example,
while the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1968), note 158 infra,
prohibits the importation of such cheap revolvers, the law has been rendered ineffective
in preventing the proliferation of these "Saturday night specials" because it still allows
parts for these guns to be imported for domestic assembly and sale. See N.Y. Times
Editorial, Aug. 23, 1971, at 28. See generally, Sherril, The Saturday Night Special and
Other Hardware, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1971, § 6 (Magazine), at 15.
157 443 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3264 (Dec. 7, 1971).
158 Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1970). This statute, also known as
the Gun Control Act of 1968, was enacted June 19, 1968 and became effective 180 days
later. The Gun Control Act of 1968 replaced the Federal Firearms Act of 1938, ch. 850,
Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894), where the common law concept of restricting weapons-bearing
traffic in firearms, the effect of which spilled into the individual states so that they
were also unable to control this traffic within their own borders through the exercise of
their police power. See note 156 supra. The fact that the United States had become
a dumping ground for cast-off military weapons that had no supporting purpose and were
easily available by mail order was painfully brought to light by the assassination of
President Kennedy. Unfortunately, it took such a catalyst to force the nation to review
its inadequate gun controls.
159 Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (1970).
1972]
ST. JOHNS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:425
ATF firearms experts that the guns were readily convertible to fire live
ammunition with the use of an electric drill in three to eight minutes.
The government then contrasted this evidence with three other sample
Molso starter guns which the ATF had examined and approved as not
being firearms and demonstrated the differences between them to the
extent that this evidence was sufficient to sustain the government's ac-
tion of confiscation and forfeiture. 160
On appeal Lee contended that the phrase "may readily be con-
verted" as contained in the statute 161 is unconstitutionally vague and
that even though this is a civil action, the government must prove the
presence of scienter. The Second Circuit, per Judge Lumbard, sum-
marily rejected these contentions, upholding the constitutionality of
the statute and denying the contention that scienter is a necessary ele-
ment of the statute. The court held that
as the proper purpose of the statute is to keep such potentially
dangerous weapons out of the hands of unlicensed dealers, we can
see no reason for requiring scienter or for reading into the statute
what is not there.162
It is clear now that federal law is transgressed if an unlicensed in-
dividual imports or deals in firearms (or starter guns and the like if they
are "readily convertible") whether or not he does so wilfully and/or
intentionally. 16
3
160 United States v. 16,179 Molso Ital. 22 Caliber Winlee Derringer Convertible
Starter Guns, 314 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. N.Y. 1970).
161 As used in the chapter, the term "firearms" means "any weapon which will or is
designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an ex-
plosive." Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921(3)(A) (1970).
162 United States v. 16,179 Moslo Ital. .22 Caliber Winlee Derringer Convertible
Starter Guns, 443 F.2d 463, 446 (2d Cir. 1971).
163 The basis for congressional regulation of firearms is articulated in United States
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). Defendant was charged with the interstate transportation
of a sawed-off shotgun in violation of the National Firearms Act. In rejecting the
contention that the act was violative of the second amendment, the Court said that the
second amendment must be interpreted and applied with the view that its obvious
purpose was to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of a well-
regulated militia. Once this tenet was established, the Court went on to hold that
absent any "evidence tending to show that possession or use of a shotgun having a barrel
of less than eighteen inches in length . . . had some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument." Id. at 179. Simi-
larly, the constitutionality of all state firearms regulatory measures is based on Miller v.
Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894), where the common law concept of restricting weapons-bearing
was firmly established. Defendant challenged a Texas statute prohibiting the carrying of
a dangerous weapon (in this case a pistol) on a public street, contending that such a
statute infringed upon his rights as a citizen and was in conflict with the second amend-
ment provision that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.
The Court rejected this contention and held the statute valid because the second amend-
ment limitations have "no reference whatever to proceedings in state courts." Id. at 538.
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The Second Circuit has demonstrated a clear determination to
keep firearms of insignificant value to the legitimate shooter (i.e., .22
caliber derringers) out of the hands of unlicensed dealers who would
presumably market them to those members of society who should prob-
ably be kept weaponless.6 4 This toughness is demonstrated by the
court's unwillingness to allow on the market pistols designed only to
make noise (starter guns) but which could readily be converted to fire
live ammunition. It has already been held that the regulation of dealers
in firearms by Title 18 of the United States Code is not violative of the
second amendment right of the people to keep and bear arms absent a
showing that licensing in any way destroys or impairs the efficiency of a
well-regulated militia. 6 5 Molso has further strengthened the law in this
area by eliminating the requirement of scienter on the part of the
dealer, thus clearly establishing the strict liability nature of the offense.
In addition, by extending the law to cover potentially dangerous fire-
arms such as blank-firing starter pistols which could readily be con-
verted to fire live ammunition, the court demonstrated the clear judicial
intention to fight the problem of weapons proliferation by utilizing fully
the applicable provisions of the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968.166
The court in the earlier case of United States v. Bass, 67 on the other
hand, reversed a conviction for possession of a firearm after finding itself
faced with a serious constitutional dilemma, thereby creating a prece-
dent-setting interpretation of Title 7 of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act.6 8 In the course of an undercover investigation of
the defendant for suspected narcotics violations, a United States Treas-
ury agent observed him in his home carrying a "Baretta" automatic
pistol while making arrangements for a purchase of narcotics. The agent
then obtained an arrest warrant for the defendant and a search warrant
for his apartment' 60 After the pistol was found under a bathtub and
164 But see Benenson, A Controlled Look at Gun Controls, 14 N.Y.L.F. 718 (1968),
where the outcry for stronger gun controls is seen as too simplistic a view. "Maniacs
cannot be kept from murder, nor delinquents from delinquency, by laws which good
citizens will obey." Id. at 747. In fact, the author sees the firearm as the least important
of all the factors which affect the commission of a crime. Contra, Mosk, Gun Control
Legislation, Valid and Necessary, 14 N.Y.L.F. 694 (1968).
165 United States v. Gross, 313 F. Supp. 1330 (S.D. Ind. 1970).
166 See United States v. Cobbler, 429 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1970), which held the Federal
Gun Control Act constitutional.
167 434 F.2d 1296 (2nd Cir. 1970).
168 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (Supp. V, 1970).
169 FEn. R. Cpus. P. 3, 4. An arrest warrant shall be issued only upon a written and
sworn complaint which as read by a reasonable man shows probable cause and belief that
an offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. However, no
warrant shall be issued unless it particularly describes the person or thing to be seized.
See Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). If the warrant had been defective
1972]
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a sawed-off shotgun was found on a night table, the defendant was
charged with two counts of possessing firearms in violation of the fed-
eral statute.'70 At his trial, the defendant did not deny ownership of the
weapons but contended that the statute was intended to reach convicted
felons only if their possession of firearms was shown to be either "in
commerce or affecting commerce" and that absent such an allegation
in the indictment, he must be acquitted. The lower court rejected this
contention and convicted the defendant but nevertheless added that:
[T]he defendant does not quite say, but tentatively hints that there
may be constitutional doubts about the statute as it has been de-
fined to apply to his case. [However] [t]he Court perceives no solid
basis for such doubt.17'
On appeal, defendant reiterated his contention that the govern-
ment failed to prove that his possession of the firearms was "in commerce
or affecting commerce" as required by the statute, and alternatively that
the statute should be declared unconstitutional if it sanctioned a convic-
tion for possession of firearms absent proof of some nexus between the
possession and interstate commerce. The question presented focused on
the phrase "in commerce or affecting commerce" and whether it modi-
fies "transports" alone, or whether it also applies to receipt and posses-
sion. Not surprisingly this question has plagued several district courts
with conflicting results. 7 2 Similarly, the only court of appeals decision
interpreting the statute was United States v. Daniels,173 where a convic-
tion for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under the statute in
question, was affirmed by simply citing the opinion of the district court
in Bass.174 The government on appeal contended that the word "trans-
and the arrest technique declared illegal as a result, all evidence seized incidental to the
arrest would have been inadmissible.
170 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (Supp. V, 1970) provides substantially that any person
who has been convicted of a felony, or adjudged a mental incompetent, or is a dishonor-
ably discharged veteran, or who has renounced his citizenship, or is an alien illegally
in the country who receives, possesses or transports in commerce or affecting commerce
any firearm shall be subject to a $10,000 fine and/or up to 2 years' imprisonment. De-
fendant had previously been convicted of the felony of attempted grand larceny in the
second degree so as to allegedly place him within the statute.
171 United States v. Bass, 308 F. Supp. 1385, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
172 See United States v. Harbin, 313 F. Supp 50 (N.D. Ind. 1970), which invoked the
rule that penal statutes should be construed in favor of the accused. Consequently, the
court granted a motion dismissing the indictment charging defendant, a previously con-
victed felon, with possessing a firearm but not alleging any connection between his
possession of the weapon and interstate commerce. But see United States v. Davis, 314 F.
Supp. 1161 (N.D. Miss 1970), which held that the words "in commerce or affecting com-
merce" contained in the statute making it an offense for a convicted felon to possess
firearms were surplusage and that their ommission from the indictment did not invalidate
it.
173 431 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1970).
174 308 F. Supp. 1885 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). This inconsistency of judicial opinion concern-
[Vol. 46:425
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ports" is the only word modified by the commerce requirement, citing
the arrangement of the commas as well as a canon of statutory construc-
tion that a limiting clause is deemed to apply solely to its last antecedent
unless the subject matter requires a different construction. 17 The thrust
of the government's argument was interpreted by the court as an asser-
tion that the language of the commerce requirement employed in
section 1202 is mere surplusage, 17 6 a contention the court considered
unsatisfactory. The court held that despite the government's failure to
present a satisfactory argument via grammatical-statutory maxims, there
remained the "cardinal principle of both statutory construction and
constitutional law requiring the interpretations of statutes ... to avoid
a reading which would create serious constitutional doubts."'177 In re-
versing the conviction, the court further held that the only rational inter-
ing the statute in question is not surprising due to the absence of a meaningful legisla-
tive history of the statute. Sections 1201 and 1202 were enacted as part of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act at a time when the Congress and its constituencies
were still suffering the effects of three tragic assassinations. The significant judgments of
legislative fact reported in the statute are that the receipt, possession or transportation of
firearms by specific classes of especially risky people would constitute: (1) a threat or
burden on commerce affecting the free flow thereof, and (2) a threat to the safety of
the President and Vice President of the United States. In view of the extended debate
on numerous controversial issues which had occurred previously, Senator Long twice
set forth the purpose of an amendment to Title VII, in 114 CONG. Ec. 13,867-69, 14,772-75
(1968), where he said that both of these evils could be and would be mitigated by for-
bidding possession of firearms by the specific classes of high risk people regardless of
whether the possession itself occurred "in commerce or affecting commerce." There was
brief debate and a favorable, if cautious, reaction appeared. However, there was an
unexpected call for a vote, and Title VII passed without the amendment.
175See FTC v. Mandel Bros. Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959), cited in United States
v. Bass, 808 F. Supp. 1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States ex rel. Santanelli v. Hughes, 116
F.2d 613, 616 (3d Cir. 1940).
170The Government also attempted to find support for its interpretation of the
statute by referring to Section 1201 (18 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V, 1970)), which provides that
the receipt, possession or transportation of firearms by a member of a prohibited group
constitutes four separate threats, only one of which burdens or deals with interstate
commerce. Specifically, they: (I) threaten the safety of the President; (2) threaten the
exercise of free speech and religion; (3) threaten the effective operation of the federal
and state governments as guaranteed by article IV of the Constitution; and (4) burden or
threaten the free flow of commerce. Therefore, the government reasoned that there was
no intention to impose a commerce requirement. Again, the court reduced this argument
to mean simply that the language imposed in § 1202 (18 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp. V, 1970)),
is mere surplusage, a contention the Court held unsatisfactory. United States v. Bass, 434
F.2d 1296, 1299 (2d Cir. 1970).
177 United States v. Bass, 434 F.2d 1296, 1299 (2d Cir. 1970). In an attempt to estab-
lish the constitutionality of the statute, the government cited those landmark cases
which define the power of Congress to reach intrastate occurrences which threaten, or may
threaten interstate commerce: Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickand v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). However, the circuit court distin-
guished these cases on the ground that in each, "there is something more than the mere
bald assertion that a particular activity is a burden on interstate commerce." 434 F.2d at
1299.
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pretation of the statute which avoids serious constitutional doubts is
that which requires receipt, possession and/or transporataion to be
shown to have been "in commerce or affecting commerce."' 78 Therefore,
in the face of casting serious constitutional doubts upon the entire
statute, the court reversed petitioner's conviction. 7 9
Since the powers of Congress are confined to those expressed in
article I of the Constitution as limited by the tenth amendment, it
would appear that state gun-control regulations would face fewer
constitutional barriers save any restrictive provisions in the individual
state constitutions. Despite this, their effectiveness in stopping firearms
proliferation is often nil because of the non-uniformity of legislation
from state to state. 8 0
Clearly what is needed is pervasive legislation which by including
substantial due process safeguards would serve the dual function of
protecting society at large without infringing upon the rights of legiti-
mate shooters to own and use firearms.' 8 '
CPLR 301
AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
In one of only three en banc hearings during the 1970 term, the
court of appeals in Scanapico v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac
R.R.182 stated that its prior panel decision 83 upholding personal juris-
178 United States v. Bass, 434 F.2d 1296, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1970).
179 Id.
180 Except for Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Utah, 44 of
the 50 states have passed statutes making it possible for residents to purchase rifles and
shotguns from federally licensed dealers in adjacent states. Under the 1968 Federal
Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1968), enactment of such statutes allows resi-
dents to purchase firearms outside of their home states. Now, residents can "shop next
door." For example, Missouri touches no fewer than eight other states. See AzmucN
RiFLEMAN, Sept. 1971, at 23.
181 See Benenson, A Controlled Look at Gun Controls, 14 N.Y.L.F. 718 (1968), where
a possible solution is presented. A procedure would be established whereby one would
voluntarily apply for a United States Firearms Identity Card. The only reasons for
refusal would be a recent conviction for a violent crime, confinement for alcoholism,
narcotics addiction, or mental defects. There would be a provision for persons who had
recovered from a restrictive disability to present evidence to that fact. Any denial of
a card would be appealable to a board consisting of firearms experts, police, and
ordinary citizens. A denial by this board would finally be appealable to the federal
district court. All card holders would be then permitted to buy firearms anywhere as
long as local laws were not thus violated. Also, there would be a specific provision which
would invite the states to require that every gun owner in the state acquire the federal
identity card. This proposed law would be a good start in establishing a uniform national
system of screening gun owners and is a logical compromise, in the best of American
political traditions, between opposing factions.
182 439 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1970).
183 The initial appeal was decided on July 16, 1970 before Circuit Judges Lumbard
and Hays and District Judge Blumenfeld. The rehearing by the court en banc was de-
cided December 18, 1970 in an opinion by Chief Judge Friendly.
